Greetings from the North of England. This post has nothing really to do with the photos, but that I've had these thoughts while walking along the River Wear and gazing at the Durham Castle from my office at the IAS.


In a post from the not-too-distant past, I sketched some views about whether Fisher's 'fundamental theorem' of natural selection is 'fundamental' (in some sense to be discovered and not defined). Here are those views again, presented in a slightly different way, with the addition of Alan Grafen's (2003) view. At the end, I state what I think is the best that can be said for the theorem's biological importance. (Thanks to all the folks in the Department of Science and Technology Studies at University College London who patiently listened to my seminar on the topic --and to Joe Cain who hosted me.)
Here's the theorem as we know it today (Edwards 1994, p. 450):
The rate of increase in the mean fitness of any population at any time ascribable to natural selection acting through changes in gene frequencies is exactly equal to its additive genetic variance at that time.
Here's a litany of folks who've evaluated the theorem's significance.
Fisher ([1930] 1999, pp. 36-37)
"[T]he fundamental theorem ... bears some remarkable resemblances to the second law of thermodynamics. Both are properties of populations, or aggregates, true irrespective of the nature of the units which compose them; both are statistical laws; each requires the constant increase in a measurable quantity, in the one case the entropy of the physical system and in the other the fitness ... of a biological population ... Professor Eddington has recently remarked that 'The law that entropy always increases --the second law of thermodynamics-- holds, I think, the supreme position among the laws of nature'. It is not a little instructive that so similar a law should hold the supreme position among the biological sciences."
Price (1972, pp. 139-140)
"First of all, the generality of [Fisher's] theorem is very great since it depends only on statistical smoothing through large population size and on assumptions of absence of meiotic and gametic selection that are involved in the derivation of [the theorem]."
"We may next note that the 'fundamental theorem' is very probably the most that anyone has yet been able to say correctly about evolutionary increase in fitness under general and realistic natural conditions. Thus, the theorem is by no means a trivial, uninteresting result."
"Still one feels disappointed that it does not say more ... Much more interesting would be a theorem telling of increase in 'fitness' defined in terms of some fixed standard. Thus there is the challenge here to find a deeper definition of this elusive concept 'fitness' and to give a deeper explanation of why it increases and under what conditions."
Ewens (1989, pp. 178-179)
"Price's concluding view [of the theorem] is in the negative, and he is 'disappointed that [the theorem] does not say more' ... These views are in line with my own negative assessment of the theorem as a biological statement."
"... [T]here appears to be no justification for singling out the partial change [in mean fitness] as isolating the 'natural selection' or 'change in gene frequency' component of the total change in mean fitness ...."
... "[W]e are left with the Fundamental Theorem as an exact, although possibly incomplete, evolutionary principle."
Edwards (1994, pp. 469-471)
"First is the historical fact ... that [the theorem] led Wright to the idea of an adaptive topography in gene-frequency space which has dominated so much thinking in evolutionary biology."
"Secondly, and of more permanent value, is the fact that the theorem gives mathematical precision to the previously vague notion 'that in species in which a higher proportion of the total variance is ascribable to genetic causes, the effective selection will be more intense than in species in which the variance is to a larger extent ascribable to environmental variations'."
"The third reason why the theorem is important is that correctly interpreted is has a considerable potential for future developments in mathematical population genetics."
Grafen (2003, p. 325)
"I have come to believe that Fisher was right in his beliefs about the importance of the theorem ... In my view, Fisher thought that his fundamental theorem isolated what we might call the adaptive engine of Darwinian natural selection."
"Thus the partial nature of change is not an inability to find a stronger result [contra Price and Ewens]. Fisher believed that this partial change was the only aspect of the changes in a population's genetic constitution that was progressive, that could create design."
Plutynski (2006, p. 75)
"Why did Fisher regard his theorem as so very 'fundamental'? The answer is that the fundamental theorem was a culmination of Fisher's lifelong project to vindicate Darwinism and unify the biometrical gradualist model of evolution and Mendelism in a rigorous mathematical theorem analogous to the physical sciences."
Here's about the best I think can be said about the theorem, based on what's gone before:
Fisher, Price, and Ewens are right that the scope of the theorem is very broad, but Price and Ewens are wrong to imply that scope is irrelevant to the theorem's biological significance. If there's anything to the claim that science (whatever "science" is) aims for general law-like statements or universal laws, then scope is relevant to the theorem's being fundamental. Price and Ewens are also wrong that the theorem's "incompleteness" is a defect because....
Fisher, Edwards, and Grafen are right that Fisher's isolation of natural selection and the additive genetic variance is a biologically deep statement that sets the speed limit on adaptive evolution. That is, the partial change in mean fitness says something biologically deep about the nature of selection. And, anyway, Edwards points out that the theorem is expandable (rather than worrying about its being incomplete). Of course, Edwards and Grafen are wrong to not include scope.
(Note that I've left out Plutynski. I think she's answering the wrong question.)
I'm not sure how far I can go to endorse the above. My main concern is that "additive genetic variance" is not biologically special. That is, I think Ewens is on to something when he says that there's no justification for isolating any change in gene frequencies that calls out natural selection. But, in order to really make my concern into a criticism, I've got to work through a bunch of literature on the relationship between additive and non-additive genetic variance and natural selection. Of course, I don't think doing so will settle anything. Folks get very ... excited about additive genetic variance, narrow heritability, the breeder's equation and all that. And I'm not sure I have anything original to say. But we'll see.
References
A. W. F. Edwards (1994), "The Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection", Biol. Rev. 69: 443-474.
W. Ewens (1989), "An Interpretation and Proof of the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection", Theo. Pop. Bio. 36: 167-180.
R. A. Fisher ([1930] 1999), The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford University Press.
A. Grafen (2003), ""Fisher the Evolutionary Biologist", The Statistician 52: 319-329.
G. Price (1972), "Fisher's 'Fundamental Theorem' Made Clear", Ann. Hum. Genet., Lond. 36: 129-140.
A. Plutynski (2006), "What Was Fisher's Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection and What Was It For?", Stud. Hist. Phil. Biol. & Biomed. Sci. 37: 59-82.
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